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ABSTRACT
Risk assessment is made on the basis of a system of emergency situations 
/ES/. An ES is the combination of a mode of operation /MOP/ and an initiating 
event /INE/. The wide range of operating parameters /temperatures up to 
130°C, pressures up to 3 bar/ and the unique construction /regulation of the 
reactor by changing the water height under pressure/ necessitated the con­
sideration of different MOP's. A total of 16 MOP's and 24 IHE's is considered. 
The transients triggered by the ES's are analysed making use of cause-con­
sequence charts. Risk is expressed in terms of reactivity addition rates and 
the corresponding probabilities.
АННОТАЦИЯ
Риск оценивается на основе системы исходных состояний /ИС/. ИС - это 
комбинация режима эксплуатации и события, которое может привести к аварии. 
Учитывание ИС объясняется широким диапазоном эксплуатационных параметров 
/температура до 130°С, давление до 3-х бар/ и уникальной конструкцией /регу­
лировка доливом замедлителя под давлением/. Всего учтено 16 режимов эксплу­
атации и 24 события. Переходные процессы, возникающие за счет ИС, исследо­
ваны при помощи диаграмм причина-следствие. Риск выражается скоростью увели­
чения реактивности и соответствующей вероятностью.
KIVONAT
A kockázatbecslés a kiinduló állapotok rendszere alapján történik. Ki­
induló állapotnak egy üzemmód és egy kiváltó esemény kombinációját tekinti a 
tanulmány. Ezt a tárgyalásmódot az üzemi paraméterek széles tartománya /hő­
mérséklet 130°C-ig, nyomás 3 bar-ig/, valamint a szokatlan konstrukciós meg­
oldás /nyomottvizes, vizszintszabályozásu rendszer/ indokolja. A vizsgálat 
összesen 16 kiinduló állapotra és 24 kiváltó eseményre terjed ki. A kiinduló 
állapotok által beindított átmeneti folyamatokat ok-okozati sémákkal követik 
A kockázatot reaktivitás-változási sebességek és az azoknak megfelelő való- 
szinüségek fejezik ki.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The ZR-6 critical assembly was built for reactor-physical measurements 
in WWER-type lattices. It serves as the experimental basis of a Temporary 
Research Collective of the CMEA countries. The assembly went critical in 
1972 and operated until 1977 at atmospheric pressure. Then it was recon­
structed to work at temperatures up to 130°C /ZR-бМ/. The assembly is con­
trolled by adjusting the water-height /a unique feature at elevated pressure!/ 
thus providing the possibility of measurements in cores unperturbed by absorb­
ers. The reader is referred to Appendix 1 for a short description of the 
facility.
Versatility and accessibility - the most important features of critical 
assemblies in general - are at the same time the source of increased risk of 
nuclear accidents. With this in mind, special attention has been paid to nu­
clear safety problems since the very beginning of the operation of ZR-6. The 
reconstruction, however, necessitated the quantitative evaluation of risks - 
because of the unique construction and the wide range of operating parameters 
/critical water level, temperature, boron concentration, etc./ of the assembly.
The growing need for nuclear power and public concern about its environ­
mental impacts were the main incentives that led to the development of prob­
abilistic risk assessment techniques. During the last decade a large number 
of papers have appeared in this field. However, few complete risk assessments 
are known for nuclear power plants [1-3]. To our knowledge, no such analysis 
has been made for a critical assembly.
Risk is usually defined [1] as
Risk consequence unit time Frequency | events [[ unit time J
Magnitude jI consequence [ L event
The relative frequency or probability of events is calculated from the 
failure probability of individual components on the basis of logical diagrams 
i.e. fault trees and event trees. Accident consequences are usually expressed 
in terms of numbers of fatalities or damage to property. The cause-conse­
quence charts method, a further development of fault-tree and event-tree 
analysis, is a very convenient tool for safety evaluation.
2. METHODOLOGY
Figure 1 presents the flow chart of the work done in this study.
The reactor is supposed as being in a certain mode of operation /e.g. 
operation at 130°C, control rods raised, fast drain valves closed, etc./.
At this moment, an abnormal event /e.g. rupture of a tube under pressure/ 
takes place?- it is considered an initiating event. The mode of operation and 
initiating event together define the emergency situation which, in its turn, 
determines the nature of transients /in our cases depressurization, emergency 
shutdown by safety rods and fast drain valves, boiling of the moderator, 
etc./. At the end, a safe final state is reached /reactor shut down, over­
pressure equals zero, etc./.
In some cases, a failure of the reactor protection system prevents it 
from bringing the reactor to a safe final state in which case the reactor 
will undergo physical transients which can be characterized by the reactivity 
addition rate, 9p/3t. The consequences of physical transients are not treated 
in this work. Risk is expressed in terms of 3p/3t and the corresponding prob­
abilities. For the sake of comparison, the probabilities of some non-nuclear 
events /e.g. earthquake, airplane crash/ are evaluated as well.
2.1 Modes of operation
The modes of operation are defined by the following six data /see Fig. 2/:
Code
Core shut down by absorbers? yes : 0 no s 1
PV* lid closed? no : 0 yes : 1
PV drain valve closed? * no : 0 yes i 1
CT fast drain valves closed? no : 0 yes : 1
Safety rods raised? no ; о yes : 1
Moderator temperature greater 
than 100°C? no . 0 yes . 1
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5For example, 000-000 means that the reactor is out of operation with the 
core shut down, PV lid and valve open, etc.
111-111 means that the reactor is operating under pressure with safety 
rods raised, CT fast drain valves closed, etc. In view of the fact that some 
of the possible variations of the above six data have no physical sense 
/e.g. moderator temperature cannot exceed 100°C if the PV lid is open/, a 
total of 16 modes of operation is considered.
2.2 Initiating events
Critical water heights are a function of core configuration and may go 
down as low as 27 cm. The active length of the fuel elements being 125 cm, 
it is at times practically impossible to shut down the reactor - with safety 
rods or extra absorbers - should there be an accidental inundation of the 
core. Therefore, all events that can lead - in spite of protective measures - 
to an uncontrolled water level rise in the core /e.g. uncontrolled pump op­
eration, etc./ are considered initiating events.
A special case of uncontrolled level rise is that caused by bubble forma­
tion due to boiling of the water when the system is depressurized /e.g. rup­
ture of a tube under pressure/. Special experiments were made to prove that 
the reactivity effect of depressurization is negative - in spite of level 
rise - because bubble formation decreases the moderator density in the core.
The 24 initiating events considered in this study are the following 
/see Fig. 3/:
a/ Water flow from above into the space between PV and CT due to the 
rupture of a conduit.
b/ Water flow into PV due to the rupture of the cooling pipe-coil.
с/ Water flow into PV through the open drain valve due to the rupture 
of a conduit in the shaft containing technological equipment.
d/ Water flow from above into CT due to the rupture of a conduit.
e/ Flooding of a pipe containing a detector in the reflector due to 
its rupture.
f/ Overfilling of PV due to the failure of the timer switch to stop the 
pump and to operator inadvertance.
g/ Overfilling of CT due to similar reasons.
h/ Filling of CT with water containing less boric acid than prescribed, 
in the extreme case with distilled water, due to the failure of a 
valve or operator error.
i/ Overheating /ДТ/ of water in PV due to the failure of the temperature 
controller or erroneous setting thereof.
6j/ Depressurization /Лр/ of PV due to the rupture of a pipe of maximum 
diameter, joining the steam space of PV.
к/ Fast level rise in CT due to an object falling into the space between 
PV and CT.
1/ Fast level rise in CT due to an object falling into it.
ml Displacement of PV due to buoyancy caused by the flooding of the 
reactor shaft.
n/ Displacement of CT due to buoyancy caused by the flooding of the 
space between PV and CT.
о/ Suction of water from the storage tank due to vacuum in PV caused 
by erroneous valve-settings during the cooling-down procedure.
pi Fast removal of an absorber from the core due to operator error or 
water-boiling.
q/ Simultaneous lifting of two groups of safety rods due to the failure 
of the interlock system, and to operator inadvertence.
r/ Falling of 3 fuel rods, raised along with a deformed safety rod, 
back into the core.
s/ Rupture of PV due to pressure.
t/ Airplane crash.
u/ Earthquake.
v/ Sabotage.
w/ Loss of power or water supply.
x/ Cable fire.
2.3 Emergency situations
Emergency situations are a combination of modes of operation and initi­
ating events /Table 1/. Blank spaces indicate combinations without physical 
sense, e.g. no depressurization can take place if the PV lid is open. A 
total of 60 emergency situations are considered. In addition, some initiating 
events are treated without respect to modes of operation /e.g. airplane 
crash/.
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2.4 Transients
2.4.1 Cause-consequence_charts
Cause- consequence charts /CCC's/ are used for analysing the transients. 
CCC's are a unique blend of fault trees and event trees and they permit one 
to get a clear, detailed picture of the sequence of events during a transi­
ent [4]. It is also possible by their help to evaluated risks - reactivity 
changes and their respective probabilities. A sample CCC that follows later 
will give the reader an idea about this technique.
A CCC is constructed for each of the emergency situations considered. 
The probability of an unsafe final state is evaluated making use of the 
probability of the emergency situation and of the failure of the reactor 
protection system.
2.4.2 Reliability_data
No reliability data are available for components and instruments used 
in ZR-6M. Failure rates are therefore taken from the literature [5-8] and 
are modifed /increased by a factor 3 to 10/ to account for the fact that the 
components they refer to were made to meet higher quality standards. For 
example, the failure rate of a time switch according to [8] equals 10 3h ^, 
in the present work it was supposed as being 3 x 10-3h ^.
The experience of five years' operation of ZR-6 before the reconstruc­
tion was taken into consideration as well.
2.4.3 Human_factor
The safety of the reactor depends to a great extent on the skilled and
disciplined work of the staff. It is therefore necessary to consider the
consequences of human error when constructing CCC's. For the quantitative
evaluation of CCC's human error probabilities were taken from [9]. Thus e.g.
the probability that the operator does not stop the pump filling PV, should
-2 -1the time switch fail, was taken to be QQp4 = 3 x 10 d /per demand/. 
Likewise, 0Ор2 = 3 x 10-3 d 1 is the probability that the operator does not 
respond to acoustic scram signals.
2.4.4 Emergency_situations
The probability of an emergency situation is obtained in general by 
multiplying the fault exposure time /hours per week/ by the failure rate 
/hours I^ which corresponds to the initiating event. In some cases, however,
11
several probabilities /technical failure, human error, natural catastrophe, 
etc./ have to be combined. E.g. in the case of emergency situation f/ls fault 
exposure time is calculated from the frequency of the two modes of operation 
which are considered together: t^ = 2.2 h . The unavailability /failure 
probability/ of the time switch
Qtg = *ts tfe = 3 x 10-3 h-1 x 2.2 h = 6.6 x 10-3
where Xfcg is the failure rate. This has to be multiplied by Q0p4 /see 2.4.3/ 
to obtain the probability of emergency situation f/1:
Q£1 = Q . Q. = 3 x 10-2 x 6.6 x 10~3 = 2 x lO-4 wfl op4 “ts
2.4.5 Failure_of_the_reactor_grоtection_system
The reactor protection system /RPS/ has to perform a certain sa-fety 
function if a parameter exceeds a trip limit /see Fig. 8/. The RPS fails if 
the required safety function is not performed. Failure probability /unavail­
ability/ of RPS refers to a certain parameter and to a certain safety functi­
on. E.g. Qnr is the probability that if the neutron flux exceeds 100%, there 
is no emergency shutdown by safety rods.
Failure of RPS is due in this case to the failure of one or more of the 
following 3 subsystems: neutron channels IQ^I; central logic unit /QL/; safety 
rods /QR/: Qnr = Qn + Ql + QR /small-probability approximation/.
The 6 neutron channels form a parallel system, any one of them is capable 
of producing a trip signal. where QN  ^is the unavailability of one
channel. A detailed reliability analysis of the RPS was not aimed at; the 
units are considered as a whole and their failure rates are taken from the 
sources mentioned above /2.4.2/.
A conservative estimate for the unavailability of one channel
°N1 = XN1 fcm
-3 -1where XQ = 10 h /failure rate of a detector/
-3 —1Хд = 10 h /failure rate of an amplifier/
-3 -1Xjji = XD + XN = 2 x 10 h /failure rate of a neutron channel/
t = 10 h proof test interval of the neutron channels 
/time between two periodic checks/
— ? -inThus QNp = 2 x 10 and = 0.64 x 10 , the unavailability of the
system of neutron channels.
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Unsafe failures of the central logic unit cannot remain hidden for
longer than a test cycle because if such a failure is discovered the reactor
is tripped. For the calculation of the unavailability of the logic unit, let
X be the failure rate of the logic unit and X the rate of failure considered Las an initiating event. Failure probabilities during a test cycle т will be
= X^t and Q2 = Xt respectively.
The logic unit, as a part of the RPS, fails if an initiating event is 
not followed by the necessary safety action. A conservative estimate for this 
is Q2, the probability that the failure of the logic system and the initi­
ating event take place within the same test cycle.
Let Q. = unavailability of the logic unitLi
Q = probability of the initiating event
tfe= fault exposure time /frequency of the corresponding mode of operation/
Q1 Ü2 V х2 = XL
T ^
fcfe
X t. fe
°L * JL i2 -1.45 fe
x 10'-7
QlQ
with
-33 x 10 h 
1.03 x 10-2 h 
2.2 h
Two groups of safety rods are sufficient for shutting down the reactor, 
thus the system of safety rods fails if more than one group of safety rods 
is in a faulty condition.
The unavailability of the system of safety rods
2 3Qd = 3X / 1 - Х / + Х  taking into account that
2 KX /1 - X/ is the probability that two groups of safety rods are in a faulty 
condition and the third is not; the factor of 3 takes into consideration all
possible combinations;!2 is the probability that all 3 groups of safety rods
fail at the same time.
Substituting X = 10 2 *d 2 ; Q = 3 x 10 6 d \
Thus the unavailability of the RPS in this case is
°NR = °N + °L + °R = 0,64 x 10-10 + 1*45 x 10_7 + 3 x 10~6 = 3.2 x 10~6
If water level in PV exceeds a preset value, the required safety action
is to stop the pump from filling PV. RPS unavailability in this case is
QHP QH + °L + "“rel.
13
where
Q = unavailability of two water gauges at the same time H
Q = unavailability of logic unit L
= failure probability of opening a relay contant.
Substituting the corresponding values
QHp = 9 x IO-6 + 1.4 5 x 10~7 + 10-6 = Ю " 5
Likewise, if the neutron flux exceeds 100%, the pump filling PV has to be 
stopped. In this case the unavailability is
= QM + QT + Q , =0.64 x 10~10 + 1.45 x 10-7 + 10-6 = 1.2 x IO-6 WNP N “L wrel
3. SAMPLE CAUSE-CONSEQUENCE CHART
A simple chart, CCC-f/1 is presented as an illustration of the method 
/Fig. 4/. The initiating event /f/ is the following: when filling PV, a 
timer switch stops the pump if the operator does not push a button every loo 
seconds after an acoustic signal. There is an uncontrolled level rise in PV 
if the timer switch fails and the operator, due to inadvertance or some other 
reason, does not stop the pump either. Conditions for the operation of the 
pump are CT drain valves open, safety rods raised; thus the modes of opera­
tion considered here are: 101 - 010 and 111 - 010.
When the water level in PV exceeds the permissible maximum value 
/H_,. / which corresponds to the height of the bottom of CT, the reactor
is tripped from the level gauges. If this safety action fails, the operation 
of the pump continues and - in about 10 minutes - the water level in CT 
exceeds the critical value /Нст_/ and the reactor is tripped from the neutron 
channels.
At the same time the operator is likely to interfere, if it is consi­
dered that the blinking light and acoustic signals of Trips 1 and 2 and the 
acoustic monitor of the neutron channels inevitably draw his attention to 
the incident.
To evaluate the risk, the reactivity addition rate and the corresponding
3 H “1probability have to be calculated. Level rise rate ^  = 1 mm s , reactivity
worth of level change: = 2 i mm \  so the reactivity addition rate is
А = = 1 mm s .2 ф mm = 2 ф s
14
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The Boolean equation representing CCC f/1 is
qfl qHP qNP ‘^op2
qfl /qH + qL + qrel//qN + qL
qfl /qH qN + qL + qrel/ qop2
qrel^ qop2
where q^, qHp, etc. are the corresponding Boolean variables of the probe 
abilities QHp, etc-
A rare-event approximation for the probability per week of the unsafe 
final state is
/Q„ Q„ + Qt + Q 1 / Q t fl f1 'WH VN vrel' wop2
= 2 x 10-4 /9 x K f 6 x 0.64 x lcf10 + 1.45 x 10-7 + IO-6/ 3 x 10 3
= 7.10-13
4. RESULTS
In Fig. 5 the subsumed per year probabilities of the unsafe final states
vs reactivity addition rates are plotted. For the sake of comparison, the
probabilities of two non-nuclear events /airplane crash and earthquake/ are
plotted as well. It is seen in the figure that the prbabilities of all nu-
-7 -1clear events - with a single exception - are below the 10 yr line and 
can therefore be considered as highly improbable.
There are two salient points in the figure: Y, representing a rather
high probability and Z, a considerable reactivity addition rate. It is worth
while to consider these two cases in some detail.
o"Point Y corresponds to initiating event |K, /see Fig. ЗВ/. If one wants 
to do some work inside PV after an operation at 130°C the water has to be 
cooled down to about 30°C. Operating procedures oblige the operator to vent 
PV when the temperature goes below 100°C. Should he fail to do so, absolute 
pressure within PV goes below 1 bar, following the saturation curve. If, 
in this case, another infringement of the procedures takes place; the drain 
valve of PV is opened, PV is filled from ST due to the suction of the vacuum 
inside it. No special protecting device was built in for an incident of this 
type. There is an administrative limitation to the maximum permissible quan­
tity of water in PV and ST. So the position of point Y is defined by the 
probability of multiple human failure.
It is very educative to consider point Z too. If water is pumped into 
PV with the fast drain valves of CT closed, it is possible to fill the space 
between PV and CT without filling CT /see Fig. 6А/. If, in this case, the 
reactor is tripped /e.g. by a spurious signal in the RPS or by the operator 
manually/, the six drain valves open simultaneously and there is a rapid 
level rise in CT iFig. 6В/. The reactivity addition rate is great, consider-
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Fig 6. A specia l  f a u l t  c o n d i t io n
ing that the drain valves have a diameter of 150 mm each. It is seen that in 
this way a protective action can, under certain circumstances, be the cause 
of a bad reactivity initiated accident. The associated small probability value 
is due to the built-in safety devices /level gauge, etc./.
5. SUMMARY
The method developed for the purpose of this study has the following 
features:
- it takes into account the fact that an emergency situation is 
characterized by the initiating event and the mode of operation;
- transients are analysed by the CCC technique which permits one to 
get a clear picture of the sequence of events.
The method has already proved to be a valuable tool in the design period. 
It was possible, with its help, to spot relative "weak points" of the RPS and 
to modify the construction, thereby providing the necessary safety margin.
The analysis formed part of the safety report of ZR-6M. 6
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APPENDIX 1
ZR-6M CRITICAL ASSE MBL Y
1.1 General Description
The core of the reactor is formed by VJWER-type fuel elements arranged 
in a hexagonal lattice of 12.7 mm pitch. The core is situated in the core 
tank /CT, see Fig. 7/ which, in turn, is inside the pressure vessel /PV/.
The moderator is distilled or borated water. Water is heated in PV to ope­
rating temperature and is then pumped into CT. PV is filled from the storage 
tank /ST /.
The reactor is regulated by changing the water height. There is a wide 
range of cirtical water heights depending on core configuration and boron 
concentration. Three groups of safety rods, with three rods each, serve for 
fast shutdown of the reactor in case of a scram. The safety rods, made from 
borated stainless steel, have a three-pointed asteriod section and enter the 
lattice in the space between three fuel rods. Should the safety rods fail to 
shut down the reactor, six fast-drain valves open and dump the water from CT 
into PV. Water from PV can be drained into ST through a dump valve. PV is 
situated in the reactor shaft which is in the middle of the reactor hall.
ST is in the technological shaft. The two shafts are connected by a tunnel.
Technical characteristics:
Critical water heights:
Reactivity worth of water 
level change:
Number of fuel rods:
Enrichment:
Operating temperature:
Overpressure:
Boric acid concentration:
1.2 Reactor protection system
A simplified schematic diagram of the reactor protection system is shown 
in Fig. 8. Neutron flux in the core is measured by six detectors, two of 
them operating in pulse and four in current regime. Any of these six neutron 
channels is capable of tripping th reactor if the flux exceeds a preset value. 
There are also trip settings for low doubling time.
600 ... 1000 mm
о Ы ■о-Осо mm
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Pressure in PV must always be higher than the saturation value at the 
given temperature to avoid boiling of the water. Two temperature and two 
pressure transducers trip the reactor before this unstable regime is reached.
There are also two pressure-difference transducers connected between 
PV and a puffer tank which communicates with PV through a pipe of small di­
ameter. In case of a sudden depressurization of PV /e.g. due to a tube 
rupture/ pressure in the puffer tank changes with considerable delay and the 
reactor is tripped by the pressure-difference signal.
The water level in PV must not be higher than the bottom of CT /in 
order to provide space for dumping the water/. The pump filling PV is stopped 
if the water level in PV exceeds the permissible maximum value. At the same 
time there is a reactor trip.
The central logic unit, which is self-checking, compares actual parameter 
values with trip limits and initiates the required protective action:
Trip 1: Emergency shutdown by safety rods and water dump. Should 
two drain-valves fail, the remaining four are sufficient 
to dump the water in the required short time. Trip 1 also 
stops the pump filling PV.
Trip 2: Emergency shutdown by safety rods. Should one group of 
safety rods fail, the remaining two are sufficient to 
shut down the reactor. The pump filling PV is stopped 
by this trip function, too.
Trip 3: No reactivity increase by control rods or water level 
in CT.
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APPENDIX 2.
CCC SYMBOLS
О
CDCш 0
Basic condition
Event
Comment
Either/or vertex 
/Designed safety action/
Condition vertex
Delay /minutes/
AND - gate
OR - gate
d > Consequence
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NOTATIONS, ABBREVIATIONS
A reactivity addition rate [ф s
CCC Cause - consequence chart
CT Core Tank
d"1 per demand
Dfl probability /per week/ of unsafe final state in CCC - f/1
dfl corresponding Boolean variable
H water height [cm]
Hcr cirtical water height in CT [cm]
HPV max permissible maximum water height in PV [cm]
P pressure in PV [bar]
dp pressure difference between PV and puffer tank
PV pressure vessel
Q unavailability, failure probability /per week/
Q1 unavailability of the central logic unit during a test cycle
Q2 failure probability of the reactor during a test cycle
Qfi probability of emergency situation f/1 /per week/
QH unavailability of the system of two level 
gauges [d ^]
QHP probability of failure of stopping the pump filling PV if water level exceeds
HPV max ^
OrXJ unavailability of central logic unit [d-1]
0N unavailability of the system of neutron 
channels [d- ]^
°N1 unavailability of a neutron channel [d- -^]
qnr failure probability of emergency shutdown by safety rods if neutron flux exceeds 100%
[d-1]
qnp probability of failure of stopping the pump filling PV if neutron flux exceeds 100%
Id-1]
Qop2 probability of human failure: omission of 
response to acoustic scram signals [d-'*']
^op4 probability of human failure: oversight of 
instrument readings [d-1]
°R unavailability of the system of safety rods [d X]
Qrel unavailability of a relay [d X]
Qts unavailability of a timer switch [d X]
etc. Boolean variables corresponding to the above probabilities
RPS Reactor Protection System
ST Storage Tank
fcfe failure exposure time [h]
V proof test interval of the neutron channels [h]
fc2x doubling-time [s]
T temperature [°C]
ЭН
9t level rise rate [mm s- ]^
ЭрTt
hЭН
reactivity addition rate [ф s 
reactivity worth of level change [ф mm"^]
Ф neutron flux [n cm s ]
\ failure rate [h-1 or d-*]
XA failure rate of an amplifier [h
XD failure of a neutron detector [h- ]^
XL failure rate of the central logic unit [h- ]^
XN1 failure rate of a neutron channel [h- ]^
Xt8 failure of timer switch [h
P reactivity [$ or ф]
T test cycle of central logic unit [s or h]
+ increase, rise
+ decrease, fall
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